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ABSTRACT
Recent analysis of deep neural networks has revealed their vulnerability to care-
fully structured adversarial examples. Many effective algorithms exist to craft
these adversarial examples, but performant defenses seem to be far away. In this
work, we explore the use of edge-aware bilateral filtering as a projection back to
the space of natural images. We show that bilateral filtering is an effective de-
fense in multiple attack settings, where the strength of the adversary gradually
increases. In the case of an adversary who has no knowledge of the defense, bi-
lateral filtering can remove more than 90% of adversarial examples from a variety
of different attacks. To evaluate against an adversary with complete knowledge of
our defense, we adapt the bilateral filter as a trainable layer in a neural network
and show that adding this layer makes ImageNet images significantly more robust
to attacks. When trained under a framework of adversarial training, we show that
the resulting model is hard to fool with even the best attack methods.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to targeted perturbations added to benign inputs.
The perturbed inputs, known as adversarial examples, can cause a classifier to output highly confi-
dent, but incorrect predictions. The majority of prior work has studied adversarial examples in the
context of computer vision, where they pose the clearest threat. Small perturbations, imperceptible
to humans, can be added to input images that cause a classifier to output false predictions. Because
of the particular success of neural networks in computer vision, these models are being deployed
in areas such as autonomous driving, facial recognition, and malware detection. Recent work has
shown that these systems are vulnerable in the real world to adversarial examples (Evtimov et al.,
2017), which makes the problem of resisting adversarial attacks a growing concern.
There have emerged two central lines of research for defending against adversarial examples. De-
noising approaches attempt to remove the adversarial perturbations from the inputs as a preprocess-
ing step. This is often done by filtering, or by projecting the input to a lower dimensional space that
cannot represent high frequency perturbations (Samangouei et al., 2018; Shen et al., 2017). These
methods often lead to high accuracy, even on difficult datasets like ImageNet. But it has been shown
that an attacker with knowledge of the defense can successfully circumvent them (Athalye et al.,
2018). On the other hand, Adversarial training methods use principles from robust optimization to
train models which resist adversarial attacks. Under the adversarial training framework, adversarial
examples are combined with the natural training set to increase the model’s robustness to attacks.
These methods are expensive, requiring many more training examples, and have not been shown to
scale well to natural image datasets such as ImageNet.
This paper explores the utility of bilateral filtering as both a denoising defense and a useful addition
to adversarial training. Bilateral filtering is a classic approach in computer vision for edge-aware
smoothing. Because natural images are more likely piecewise-smooth while adversarial perturba-
tions are less likely to be, we hypothesize that bilateral filtering would be able to filter out adversarial
perturbations. Indeed, in experiments we found that with appropriate parameters, a plain bilateral
filter can recover 99% of the adversarial images so that a classifier can predict the original label.
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Furthermore, we introduce BFNet: an end-to-end model incorporating bilateral filtering as a differ-
entiable layer. With BFNet, it is possible to examine the performance of white-box attacks trying to
bypass our bilateral filtering defense. We show that BFNet is naturally robust to attacks from many
such adversaries, greatly reducing the strength of both L∞ and L2 attacks on the ImageNet dataset.
Finally, we combine bilateral filtering with adversarial training, and achieve state-of-the-art results
on MNIST and CIFAR10. Our method works with zero knowledge of either the network or any
incoming attack, making it applicable to a variety of models and datasets.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
There have been many proposed attacks for creating adversarial examples. We give a brief
description of the six attacks that we used to test our models.
A. Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
In (Lyu et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018), generating an adversarial example is the task of solving the
objective maxδ≤ L(θ, x + δ, ytrue). PGD is used to maximize this objective under a loss function
L, yielding an image with a perturbation magnitude less than  with respect to the L∞ norm, and
achieves the highest possible loss on the true class.
B. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) is a one step lin-
earization of the above objective. FGSM finds adversarial examples by assuming linearity
at the decision boundary. Given an image x, we find a perturbation η under the max norm:
η =  · sign(∇xL(θ, x, y)), where θ is the parameters of the network, y is the original label, and L
is the loss function used to train the network.
C. Momentum Iterative Method
The Momentum Iterative Fast Sign Gradient Method (MI-FGSM) (Dong et al., 2018) is an iterative
version of the FGSM attack. MI-FGSM moves pixel values linearly along the gradient toward the
decision boundary. MI-FGSM improves on FGSM by introducing a momentum term into gradient
calculation:
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇xL(x
∗
t , y)
‖∇xL(x∗t , y)‖1
. The gradient is then used to iteratively update the image x∗t+1 = x
∗
t + α · (gt+1). The authors
claim that simply using an iterative FGSM leads to greedy overfitting of the decision boundary, and
thus falls into local poor maxima. Adding momentum stabilizes the update direction and creates a
stronger adversarial example.
D. L-BFGS-B
(Szegedy et al., 2014) used box-constrained L-BFGS to generate adversarial examples with minimal
distortion under the L2 norm. Given a natural image x and a target class ytrue, the adversarial
objective is as follows:
min
[
c · ||x− (x+ δ)||22 + L(x+ δ, ytarget)
]
Where δ is the adversarial perturbation, L is the loss function, and the parameter c controls the
trade-off between the magnitude and strength of the perturbation.
E. Carlini & Wagner Attack (L2)
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017) proposed three iterative attacks which create adversarial examples under
the L0, L2, and L∞ norms. In this work we consider the most powerful attack, the white-box L2
attack. Specifically, they minimize
min ||1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)− x||22 + c× f(
1
2
(tanh(w) + 1))
2
where f(x′) = max(max{Zi(x′) : i 6= t} − Zt(x′),−κ). Here, t is the target label, Z refers to
the logits of the network, κ controls the confidence of the new classification, and the 12 tanh term
constrains the result to pixel space.
F. DeepFool
Deepfool is an iterative, first order method used to find minimal distortion under the
L2 norm (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). Deepfool linearizes the classifier itself and
performs gradient descent until the image is misclassified. The DeepFool objective is
minδ ‖δ‖2 subject to arg max f(x) 6= arg max f(x + δ). In addition to the attacks
listed above, other methods have been proposed. L0 attacks such as (Papernot et al., 2016b) choose
to measure adversarial perturbations by the minimum change necessary to produce an incorrect
prediction.
2.2 ADVERSARIAL DEFENSES
There is a growing body of work on defenses against adversarial attacks (Papernot & McDaniel,
2016; Papernot et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2017; Liao et al., 2018). An averaging filter was studied in
(Li & Li, 2017). JPEG compression was studied in (Dziugaite et al., 2016; Das et al., 2017), and
was found to be effective at removing adversarial perturbations. However, JPEG encoding is not
differentiable, hence its performance when the adversary has knowledge of the defense is unknown.
Our bilateral filtering approach is fully differentiable hence we can test it against counter-attacks.
Other recent defenses attempt to remove adversarial perturbations by projecting inputs back onto
the real data manifold (Meng & Chen, 2017). (Shen et al., 2017) projects inputs using a generative
adversarial network. Given a normal or adversarial image, a generator is trained to produce a image
from the normal data distribution. This method also did not test against counter-attacks, and has
been shown to be successfully fooled by the CW attack (Meng & Chen, 2017). Our approach
can also be seen as a projection back to the data manifold, where we impose the constraint that the
resulting image must be piecewise-smooth. By fixing the filter approach, we would likely not overfit
significantly to the training set and remain effective under counter-attacks.
On the other hand, adversarial training methods (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018; Sha-
ham et al., 2018; Trame`r et al., 2018) combine adversarial examples with the natural training set to
increase the robustness of the model to adversarial attacks. These approaches are promising as they
attempt to provide a guarantee on both the type of adversary and the magnitude of the perturbation
they are resistant to. In practice however, these methods are hard to scale as they require expensive
computation in the inner training loop to generate adversarial examples. When training on a large
dataset such as ImageNet, generating a sufficient amount of strong adversarial examples can be in-
tractable. This problem has been mitigated by training against a weak adversary like FGSM (Trame`r
et al., 2018) which can quickly generate adversarial examples. But training models that are robust
to strong adversaries on ImageNet or CIFAR-10 is still an open problem.
3 METHOD
In this paper, we consider white-box threat models where the attacker has full access to the training
data, model parameters and architecture. This is categorically more difficult than black-box threat
models where the attacker has little or no knowledge about the model or training data. We will
first show the utility of bilateral filter against simple attacks without knowledge of the network, then
introduce BFNet with bilateral filtering as a differentiable layer, so that we can evaluate attacks with
knowledge of our defense.
3.1 THE BILATERAL FILTER AND ITS CAPABILITY OF RECOVERING ADVERSARIAL IMAGES
The bilateral filter is a non-linear Gaussian filter that is commonly used to smooth image gradients
while preserving sharp edges. For an image I , window Ω centered at pixel p, the bilateral filter is
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formulated as a domain function Gs, and a range function Gr:
Ifiltered(p) =
1
Wp
∑
q∈Ω
Gs(||p− q||)Gr(‖Ip − Iq‖) Iq
where the normalization term Wp is:
Wp =
∑
q∈Ω
Gs(‖p− q‖)Gr(‖Ip − Iq‖),
Gs(x) = exp(− x22σ2s ) and Gr(x) = exp(−
x2
2σ2r
) are Gaussian filters, and σs and σr are parameters
which control the strength of the domain and range functions respectively. Each neighboring pixel
is assigned a weight according to both spatial closeness and value difference. If the color of the
pixels p and q are very different, then q will affect the filtered image at pixel p very little. At
sharp image boundaries, this would effectively lead to smoothing on only one side of the boundary,
since the other side would have very different color. Hence, sharp boundaries can be preserved and
oversmoothing or blurring effects that are commonly seen in Gaussian smoothing or averaging can
be prevented. In Fig.1 one can see the effect of denoising an L-BFGS-B adversarial image, where
an averaging filter will leave the image significantly blurred, but bilateral filtering would preserve
the edges. More images are shown in the appendix in Fig. 3.
We believe piecewise-smoothness is an inherent property of many images hence bilateral filtering
offered a projection back to this manifold of piecewise-smooth images. Convolutional networks
only work on images from the natural image manifold, which left the hole for adversarial examples
to maneuver by creating off-manifold images. By using bilateral filtering to force images to be on
the manifold, we would leave significantly less holes for adversarial examples to maneuver on.
To test the efficacy of the bilateral filter to recover clean inputs from adversarial examples, we
generated a set of adversarial examples from a range of powerful adversaries. Our first approach
was to manually tune parameters for each input image, to test the effective range of parameters
which could recover the original label from an adversarial example. We found that with carefully
chosen parameters, the corrupted labels could indeed be recovered. Our experiments showed that the
small perturbations created by iterative methods like the Carlini & Wagner attack and DeepFool were
easier to remove with a bilateral filter than the larger perturbations created with one step attacks. To
remove perturbations generated by iterative attacks, we used small kernels 3 - 5 pixels wide, and σs,
σr values of 0.5. Filtering with larger kernel sizes offers no benefit, as the resulting images from
iterative attacks have imperceptible perturbations which are removed with small filters. One step
attacks perturb every pixel in the image with the same magnitude of noise. As a result, we increased
kernel width to 7 and σs to 3, holding σr constant. These parameters reliably removed adversarial
perturbations from L∞ attacks with a bounded distance of 0.3, as well as unbounded L2 attacks.
The results can be found in Table 1.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: (a) The original LBFGS-B adversarial image, (b) The image after 3x3 bilateral filtering
and (c) The image after 3x3 averaging filtering. The bilateral filter is superior since it removes small
perturbations while preserving sharp edges in the image, keeping it from becoming blurry
3.2 ADAPTIVE FILTERING
One caveat to the above approach, is that the parameters for the bilateral filter must be carefully
chosen to be able to recover the accuracy and confidence of the original classification. Large values
for the parameters σs and σr can create an excessively blurred image, and a small filter size K
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Network FGSM MI-FGSM DeepFool CW (L2) L-BFGS
Inception V3 97.0 97.5 98.8 99.2 97.8
InceptionResNet V2 94.2 98.4 96.3 98.8 95.1
ResNet V2 96.5 98.0 96.1 98.1 98.0
Table 1: Recovery performance for manually chosen bilateral filter parameters. We measure recov-
ery by the percentage of examples which, after filtering, revert to the classification label assigned to
the unperturbed image by the CNN. This shows that with adaptively chosen parameters according
to the attack, we can recover nearly all adversarial examples
may capture insufficient information to remove the adversarial perturbations. With this in mind,
we train a small network which will predict the parameters of the bilateral filter (K,σs, σr) for an
input image. This network will serve as a cheap preprocessing step that will remove adversarial
perturbations without affecting the underlying class label.
To build our classifier we first extract information about the distribution of pixel gradients by con-
volving the input with a Sobel filter in the x and y direction. Because adversarial attacks directly
change values of the input, adversarial examples will often have larger color gradients in the x and
y direction than natural images. We concatenate the gradient map depth-wise with the input image,
and use three dilated convolutional layers with 64, 128, and 256 filters respectively, followed by 2x2
max pooling and a linear layer of 64 units. We use a dilation rate of 2 for each convolutional layer.
Note this experiment is stand-alone and it is not utilized in the BFNet proposed in the next section.
3.3 BFNET: ADDING BILATERAL FILTERING AS A TRAINABLE LAYER
The main idea of BFNet is to always preprocess the input image with bilateral filter before inputting
it into the CNN. Namely, instead of computing f(x) where f is learned by a deep network, always
computing f(BF (x)) instead. Hence we can then optimize for attacks that have full knowledge and
gradients about our defense. This has two utilities, one is to examine the robustness of the defense,
and secondly we can add the newly generated adversarial examples back to the training set of the
network, in order to perform adversarial training.
A brute-force implementation of the bilateral filter has a O(n2) cost associated with computing the
response of individual pixels. Making it the most expensive operation in the graph. To reduce com-
putation time, We choose as our preprocessing function the Permutohedral Lattice implementation
of the bilateral filter (Adams et al., 2010), which is also fully differentiable and can be computed in
O(n) time. This can then be attached as the first layer to any other network, and the bilateral filter
parameters can be trained jointly with other parts of the network.
3.4 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
It has been shown that under the white-box threat model, using a denoiser as the only defense is
insufficient to stop the strongest adversarial attacks. Currently the most promising direction for
training models robust to adversarial attacks is adversarial training. Despite continuing progress on
both MNIST and CIFAR10, adversarial training is still very expensive, and performs worse than
denoising approaches on the same datasets. We propose an approach combining adversarial training
with BFNet, giving a robust, performant classifier on different threat models.
Following (Madry et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2017), the adversarial training
framework can be expressed as the following saddle point problem with model parameters θ, and
input x with true label y:
min
θ
f(x; θ) where f(x; θ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ
L(θ, x+ δ, y)
]
where a solution to the inner maximization problem represents the most adversarial example within
some perturbation budget. Solving the outer minimization problem yields a classifier which is robust
to the above adversary. (Madry et al., 2018) showed that PGD could reliably solve the inner maxi-
mization problem without linearization, and is thus a better adversary to train against than FGSM.
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We propose a modification to the above saddle point formulation which incorporates the BFNet:
min
θ
f(BF (x)) where f(x) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ
L(θ, x+ δ, ytrue)
]
where BF (x) is the bilateral filter in BFNet.
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 ADAPTIVE FILTERING MODEL
In this section we show that our adaptive filtering model can correctly predict filtering parameters
which will restore an adversarial input. To test this, we generate a dataset of 1,000 adversarial images
from the ILSVRC 2012 validation set with five different attacks: Projected Gradient Descent with
40 steps (PGD), Box constrained L-BFGS, The Carlini & Wagner L2 attack (CW), The Momentum
Iterative FGSM (MIM), FGSM, and DeepFool. Where applicable, we constrain the perturbations to
an -ball of radius 0.3 from the training example. Source images have been normalized to a range
of [−1, 1].
To construct our training set we use a separate 1,000 images generated from each of the attacks in
table 1. For each image, we collect labels in the form of triples (K,σs, σr), K denotes the kernel
size, and σs, σr are the standard deviation for the spatial and range kernels respectively. Given
any adversarial example, there may be many permutations of parameters for the bilateral filter that
successfully denoise the input. For this reason we collect a maximum of 10 different parameter
configurations for each image in our training set. Given this is a multi-class prediction problem, we
train using a sigmoid function at the output of our network to predict a set of candidate parameter
configurations. At test time we evaluate with the parameters predicted by the maximally activated
output unit. Our results are presented in tables 2, and 3.
We used the pretrained Inception V3 (Szegedy et al., 2016) and InceptionResNet V2 (Szegedy et al.,
2017) ImageNet classifiers as our source networks. To generate adversarial examples on these net-
works, we used the open-source Cleverhans toolbox (Papernot et al., 2016a). the model was trained
using SGD with Nesterov momentum for 25 epochs. We then test on six different validation sets,
one for each adversary respectively.
Source Network Clean FGSM PGD MIM CW DeepFool L-BFGS
AF+Inception V3A 95.0 89.0 90.7 79.1 89.1 90.3 81.3
AF+Inception V3B 95.0 95.9 98.0 96.4 94.1 95.3 96.2
AF+InceptionResNet V2A 91.1 87.2 87.1 75.3 87.8 85.0 80.8
AF+InceptionResNet V2B 91.1 93.1 98.0 94.3 97.8 92.0 95.3
Table 2: Performance of our adaptive bilateral filter (AF) network across different attacks. We show
(A) the top-5 accuracy of recovering the original predicted classification label from the adversarial
example (note this is not necessarily the ground truth label), as well as (B) how often AF is able to
defeat the adversarial attack - changing the prediction from the adversarial label to a new one
Network Clean FGSM PGD MIM CW DeepFool L-BFGS
Inc V3 top1 78.8 30.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.0
Inc V3 top5 94.4 65.2 4.8 5.5 7.3 0.5 12.1
AF + Inc V3 top1 71.7 71.0 71.6 63.1 71.1 70.1 64.2
AF + Inc V3 top5 89.6 84.0 86.3 74.6 84.1 85.2 76.7
IncResNet V2 top1 80.4 55.3 0.8 0.5 0.3 2.5 0.0
IncResNet V2 top5 95.3 72.1 15.8 10.2 10.3 8.5 19.2
AF + IncResNet V2 top1 73.1 70.1 70.8 60.5 70.3 70.5 65.0
AF + IncResNet V2 top5 86.7 83.1 82.8 71.7 83.6 85.6 77.0
Table 3: Top-1 and top-5 accuracy of InceptionV3 and Inception-ResNetV2 on adversarial examples.
We can see that adaptive filtering significantly increases the robustness of the classifier against many
diverse attacks
It can be seen that we recover adversarial examples generated by FGSM, PGD, CW and DeepFool
near perfectly, while missing nearly 15% of the examples of MIM and L-BFGS. These results are
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significantly better than the results in (Li & Li, 2017), which used a 3x3 average filter to recover
images. Our Adaptive Filtering network succeeds in removing adversarial examples generated on
natural images, with a relatively simple network. This makes the Adaptive Filtering network a viable
method for defending networks against an adversary who employs a wide range of attacks.
4.2 BFNET DEFENDING AGAINST COUNTER ATTACKS ON IMAGENET
Due to the high cost of adversarial training on natural images, on ImageNet we perform only one
round of counter-attack, which is: have the attack knows about BFNet and attack it by backprop-
agating through the entire BFNet defense. We use this as an opportunity to test the robustness of
BFNet that cannot be attributed to adversarial training. To this end, we use the Inception V3 and
the Inception-ResNet V2 networks, and add our bilateral filter layer to the input, keeping the pre-
trained ImageNet weights. We test against both L2 and L∞ adversaries to obtain a complete picture
of the robustness of BFNet. L∞ is a more informative metric when discussing the magnitude of
adversarial attacks on very small images, because a large perturbation measured under the L∞ norm
equates to a large visual change across few pixels. But with large natural images, a perturbation with
a large L∞ distance is less interpretable. A large change to a single pixel may still go unnoticed to
a human observer, while a large perturbation under the L2 norm gives more information about the
total distortion caused by the adversarial attack.
(a) Adversarial examples generated by L-BFGS on a BFNet version of the Inception V3 classifier. Generated
adversarial examples have visually identifiable perturbations, and have an average L2 norm of 106.2
(b) Adversarial examples generated by DeepFool on a BFNet version of the Inception V3 classifier. The gener-
ated adversarial examples have large, noisy perturbations, and have an average L2 norm of 181.2
Figure 2: Adversarial images created with BFNet. See the appendix for adversarial images from the
same original images without BFNet
To measure resistance to attacks under the L2 norm, we use the unbounded attacks L-BFGS and
DeepFool. It is impossible to be fully resistant to unbounded attacks, because any image can be
changed to a completely different image and its CNN output would certainly change. Hence, we
report the average L2 and L∞ distance of the adversarial images to the original ones from the
unbounded attacks. From Table 4 we can see that our approach yields a very robust model against
adversarial perturbations under the L2 metric. When attacking our BFNet models with DeepFool,
we see that the generated adversarial image has an L∞ distance over 30x larger, when compared to
an unmodified network of the same architecture. Similarly, we can see that the L2 distance of an
adversarial generated against BFNet is far larger when compared to adversarial images generated
against a network of the same architecture without the bilateral filter. With respect to the L-BFGS
attack, we see a similarly large disparity between BFNet and a vanilla network. Fig.2 shows some
examples of images generated by those adversarial counterattacks. One can see that the DeepFool
and LBFGS attacks had to significantly modify the image to defeat BFNet, creating clearly visible
patterns. An adversarial detector or a human eye would easily be able to detect those attacks.
7
DeepFool L-BFGS
Network L∞ L2 L∞ L2
Inception V3Natural 0.015 0.43 0.02 0.67
Inception V3BFNet 0.621 148.29 0.39 90.52
IncResNet V2Natural 0.025 0.44 0.06 0.77
IncResNet V2BFNet 0.793 187.45 0.65 90.65
Table 4: Performance of BFNet against DeepFool and L-BFGS attacks. We report the average L2
and L∞ distance of 1, 000 adversarial images on Inception V3 and Inception-ResNet V2.
For the L∞ attacks such as FGSM, and MI-FGSM we measure the resistance of our model to
different values of perturbation . We can see that our BFNet significantly decreases the attack
strength of L∞ adversaries, in most cases by over 50%. Of particular note is that we show more
significant resistance to adversarial perturbations of  ≤ 0.3. Larger perturbations are visually
discernible, and thus are less adversarial than smaller fooling perturbations. For both attacks we use
1,000 random images sampled from the ILSVRC 2012 validation set, and report the percentage of
successful attacks against the natural model and BFNet respectively.
FGSM MI FGSM
Network Epsilon Natural BFNet Natural BFNet
Inception V3 0.1 73.2 30.2 58.8 21.0
Inception V3 0.15 78.6 36.6 65.6 30.1
Inception V3 0.3 93.2 46.6 88.2 42.2
Inception V3 0.5 99.0 63.2 98.0 52.4
Inception V3 0.75 100.0 90.8 99.6 53.4
Inception V3 1.0 100.0 99.8 99.6 70.8
IncResNet V2 0.1 58.8 42.6 89.1 59.0
IncResNet V2 0.15 65.6 55.4 90.6 38.6
IncResNet V2 0.3 88.2 75.4 92.2 59.4
IncResNet V2 0.5 98.0 91.0 100.0 74.6
IncResNet V2 0.75 99.6 99.6 100.0 80.2
IncResNet V2 1.0 99.6 99.6 100.0 91.8
Table 5: Performance of BFNet against FGSM and MI-FGSM adversaries for a range of perturbation
sizes (lower is better). For our MI-FGSM attack, we use a momentum decay factor of 1.0, and run
the attack for 10 iterations
4.3 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Finally, we experiment on adversarial training with BFNet on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets.
4.3.1 MNIST
To show that BFNet is robust to strong first-order adversaries, we train a small CNN to 99.2% accu-
racy on the test set. Our model consists of 2 convolutional layers with 32 and 64 filters respectively,
each followed by 2 x 2 max pooling and ReLU. We use a final fully connected layer with 1024
units. We modify our network into a BFNet by adding our bilateral filter layer at the input of the first
convolutional layer. We then train with adversarial training using three distinct adversaries: FGSM,
PGD, and PGD with the proposed CW loss function. We report the results in table 6. Our results
perform well against the state-of-the-art adversarial training results. We also show that when our
network is trained on a single strong adversary, we are robust to attacks from other adversaries.
During training we observe a faster convergence in training loss (see Appendix), and increased
robustness to white-box FGSM, PGD, and CW attacks, when trained against only the PGD attack.
However, the model trained against FGSM does worse against stronger adversaries such as PGD, as
the attack itself is a weak adversary.
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Network Clean FGSM PGD CW CW
(κ=50)
BFNetpgd 99.0 95.5 98.0 93.2 -
BFNetfgsm 99.0 98.1 36.4 88.2 96.0
Madry 98.8 95.6 93.2 94.0 93.9
TramerA 98.8 95.4 96.4 - 95.7
TramerB 98.8 97.8 - - -
Method Type Clean FGSM PGD
BFNetpgd A 87.1 55.2 50.4
BFNetpgd B 73.1 64.5 38.1
BFNetfgsm B 76.5 70.6 12.2
Madry A 87.3 56.1 45.6
Table 6: LEFT: Comparison of our method with state of the art adversarial training results on
MNIST. BFNetpgd denotes our model trained against a PGD adversary, while BFNetfgsm is trained
against a FGSM adversary. For Tramer We report A: the strongest white box attack given against a
non-ensembled model from (Trame`r et al., 2018), as well as B: the performance of architecture B
from (Madry et al., 2018); RIGHT: Performance of our two adversarially trained BFNets on CIFAR-
10. BFpgd denotes our model trained against a PGD adversary, while BFNetfgsm is trained against
a FGSM adversary. Network type (A) refers to the ResNet network used in (Madry et al., 2018),
while (B) refers to the smaller architecture.
4.3.2 CIFAR10
We perform similar experiments to test BFNet on CIFAR-10. We use a network with four convo-
lutional layers, each followed by 2x2 max pooling. A linear layer of 4, 096 units is used before
softmax. For BFNet, a differentiable bilateral filter layer to preprocess the images. When naturally
trained with Adam for 30 epochs, this network reaches an accuracy of 79.04% on the test set. We
also train the original ResNet-18 model used in (Madry et al., 2018) for 80K iterations. Trained on
natural examples we reached an accuracy of 92.7% on the test set. Each model is then trained adver-
sarially with PGD and FGSM, respectively. We use an L∞ bound of  = 8 for both adversaries. We
use 20-step PGD with a learning rate of 2.0. We report our results in Table 6 and it can be seen that
our BFNet trained on PGD outperforms (Madry et al., 2018) significantly on the PGD adversary.
In contrast to MNIST, CIFAR-10 remains a very challenging dataset. The higher dimensionality
makes robust training significantly more difficult. Because CIFAR-10 is too small, the edges are not
so obvious, which could have hurted our performance. We believe that the bilateral filtering poses
more constraint in larger natural images, such as ImageNet.
CONCLUSION
The continued existence of adversarial examples, and the lack of effective defenses limits our abil-
ity to deploy AI systems in critical areas where safety and security are necessary. In this paper we
showed that a bilateral filter can be used as a core part of versatile, effective defenses to recover clean
images from perturbed ones. The bilateral filter remains effective when deployed with numerous de-
fense strategies: as a manual preprocessing step, a trained denoiser, or a robust model that is trained
end-to-end. Our defense holds in multiple attack settings where the attacker has knowledge about
it. In the future we hope to explore even better filter approaches which projects even better to the
natural image manifold and limit adversarial examples, as well as combining it with an adversarial
detection approach to construct a comprehensive defense.
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5 APPENDIX
5.1 MORE EXAMPLES OF BILATERAL FILTERING RESULTS ON ADVERSARIAL IMAGES
Fig. 3 shows more examples of adversarial images from several different attacks after bilateral
filtering.
Figure 3: The effect of bilateral filtering on adversarial inputs. From left to right, we show the
adversarial perturbation, the clean image, the adversarial images generated by the respective attack
algorithms, and the recovered image after bilateral filtering. Note that bilateral filtering does not
destroy image quality, and images can be correctly classified.
5.2 ADVERSARIAL IMAGES WITHOUT BFNET
Fig. 4 shows the images generated with DeepFool and L-BFGS on ImageNet without BFNet added
to preprocess the images. Compared with Fig. 2, these adversarial images are indiscernible with real
ones from human eyes.
5.3 CONVERGENCE OF THE ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Fig. 5 shows the convergence of the adversarial training.
5.4 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES THAT FOOLED THE ADVERSARIALLY TRAINED BFNET
Fig.6 and Fig.7 showed all the failure images after adversarial training on the MNIST dataset.
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(a) Adversarial images generated with DeepFool on a vanilla Inception V3 classifier. The adversarial images
are visually identical to the real images, and have an average L2 norm of 0.09
(b) Adversarial examples generated by an L-BFGS adversary on a vanilla Inception V3 classifier. The ad-
versarial examples have an average L2 distance of 0.025 from their natural counterparts, and have visually
imperceptible perturbations.
Figure 4: Adversarial images generated by DeepFool and L-BFGS without BFNet, to be compared
with Fig.2
(a) (b)
Figure 5: The average mini-batch batch accuracy (a) and cross entropy loss (b) for the model trained
with adversarial training on MNIST. We trained our model to convergence, which happened near
20k iterations. We can see that the training is stable and converges to a similar training error as a
naturally trained network
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Figure 6: PGD adversarial examples which fool an adversarially trained BFPGD with  = 0.3
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Figure 7: FGSM adversarial examples which fool adversarially trained BFfgsm with  = 0.3
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